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Audit committee chair and financial reporting timeliness: A focus on financial, experiential and 
monitoring expertise 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this study we examine the impact of audit committee chair financial, experiential and monitoring 
expertise on the financial reporting timeliness.  We find that experiential expertise of audit 
committee chairs reduces the delay in the audit report lag resulting in more effective audit 
committee chairs, at least in the face of financial reporting timeliness.  We also find that monitoring 
expertise of audit committee chairs have a significant negative impact on the audit report lag and 
hence improve the financial reporting timeliness.  These are important findings from practice, 
academic and public policy perspectives.   
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Audit committee chair and financial reporting timeliness: A focus on financial, experiential and 
monitoring expertise 
 
1.  Introduction 
Recent governance changes have placed a particular burden on audit committees and their 
members. Their workload has grown significantly, with a broad set of responsibilities requiring a 
great deal of diligence in every aspect of their work. The role of the audit committee chair is critical 
in supporting the audit committee’s ability to carry out its responsibilities effectively. It has been 
argued that the audit committee needs a chair with the knowledge and commitment to drive the 
committee’s work (Bromilow and Keller, 2011). However, a specific focus on the chair of the audit 
committee has been missing in the extant academic research.   
The audit committee chair is considered the ‘‘CEO of the audit committee’’ (Ernst & Young 
2011, p8) and the ‘‘focal point for the committee’s relations with the board, the CFO, and the internal 
and external auditors’’ (Schmidt and Wilkins 2013, p227). The chair has greater responsibility than 
other audit committee members for financial reporting failures and therefore plays a pivotal role in 
overseeing financial reporting and essentially determining the effectiveness of the audit committee 
(Bromilow and Keller, 2011).  Recent research has found the role played by the audit committee 
chair significantly reflects that of a person who is in charge of steering a group of people 
(PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2003; Turley and Zaman, 2007; Ernest and Young, 2011).   This role 
involves ensuring adequate information flows within and to and from the audit committee, ensuring 
an open relationship between the committee and management, internal auditors, and external 
auditors, setting the agenda for audit meetings, providing important mediation between the auditor 
and management team on financial reporting issues, and leading monitoring of the external auditor 
(Turley and Zaman, 2007; Tanyi and Smith, 2015). These tasks can have a direct impact on the way 
the audit committee behaves and responds to its duties. Yet, given the important role played by the 
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audit committee chair, research examining audit committee chair characteristics1, specifically in 
relation to financial reporting timeliness has been lacking. In this paper we therefore consider the 
characteristics of the audit committee chair in helping improve financial reporting timeliness. 
Prior research suggests that the timely provision of accounting information plays an important 
role in firm value (Beaver et al., 1980; Schwartz and Soo, 1996; Blankley et al., 2014) and in reducing 
the information asymmetry of financial information (Jaggi and Tsui, 1999; Lee et al., 2009).  
Furthermore, financial reporting timeliness has also been shown to significantly increase the quality 
of earnings, reduce the chances that investors’ will be defrauded, and reduce uncertainty in 
evaluations of potential investments and expected payoffs (Feltham, 1972; Hakansson, 1977; 
Bushman and Smith, 2001).  This is even more important in the current information age where 
technology, media and a connected globalised world make the relevance-reliability dilemma even 
more profound.  Investors are able to choose from a proliferation of investment markets that are 
engaged in high frequency trading with reduced obstacles to capital flow, resulting in increased 
market volatility (Sultana et al., 2015).   Hence, the demand for the timely provision of auditor-
verified accounting information is crucial to capital market participants.  Moreover, recent 
regulatory changes in the UK and US suggest financial reporting timeliness is also a priority for 
regulators (Behn et al., 2006; FASB, 2010; Doyle and Magilke, 2013; Schmidt and Wilkins, 2013).   
In this study we investigate the impact of a comprehensive range of audit committee chair 
characteristics on the financial reporting timeliness of UK FTSE-350 companies between 2007 and 
2010.  Specifically, we investigate the impact of financial, experiential and monitoring expertise of 
the audit committee chair on the financial reporting timeliness by companies in our sample.    We 
find that experiential expertise of audit committee chairs reduces the delay in the audit report lag 
resulting in more effective audit committee chairs, at least in the face of financial reporting 
timeliness.  We also find that monitoring expertise of audit committee chairs has a significant 
negative impact on the audit report lag and hence improves the financial reporting timeliness.  Our 
                                                          
1 Carcello et al., (2011, p26) report this as “an unfortunate oversight” and a field “worthy of future study”. 
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findings are important from academic and public policy perspectives.  The remainder of the paper 
proceeds as follows: the next section presents the hypotheses development. Section three describes 
the sample as well as our variables, while our empirical analysis and findings are presented in section 
four.  We present our conclusions in section five.   
 
2. Hypotheses Development 
Following the extant prior literature on audit committee effectiveness, we focus specifically on 
financial, experiential and monitoring expertise of the audit committee chair.  The audit committee 
chair has the greatest responsibility for overseeing the financial reporting process and thus is more 
likely to be held accountable if anything goes wrong (Tanyi and Smith, 2013). Hence, the following 
hypotheses focus specifically on the characteristics of the audit committee chair in helping constrain 
the audit report lag.   
 
2.1 Audit Committee Chair Financial and Experiential Expertise  
Due to the complex nature of financial reporting, governance regulators around the globe have 
shown considerable interest in the financial expertise of audit committee members2.  Numerous 
studies have examined the financial expertise of audit committee members in the financial reporting 
process (Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal and Chadha, 2005; Carcello et al., 2006; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2010) and found a direct link between financial expertise of the 
audit committee and various financial reporting quality related issues.  More recently, Bruynseels 
and Cardinaels (2014) find that the proportion of financial experts on the audit committee is 
positively related to the demand for audit effort.  He and Yang (2014) report that the proportion of 
                                                          
2 In the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) mandates audit committees to include at least one 
financial expert and requires the rest of the members to be financially literate. While the Australian 
governance code (ASX, 2010) recommends all members should have accounting and financial expertise. In the 
United Kingdom, the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014, p 17) recommends that ‘at least one member of 
the audit committee should have significant, recent and relevant financial experience’. The Financial Reporting 
Council is currently proposing to replace the requirement for an audit committee member to have ‘recent and 
relevant financial experience’ to at least one member to have ‘competence in accounting and/or auditing’ 
(FRC, 2015). 
5 
 
financial experts on the audit committee is related to significantly lower earnings management level, 
whilst Schmidt and Wilkins (2013) and Sultana et al., (2015) note how companies with more 
accounting financial expertise on the audit committee are associated with improved financial 
reporting timeliness. 
Given these arguments, and the importance of the audit committee chair as a focal point for 
audit committee effectiveness, we suggest there is a greater onus on the audit committee chair to 
be financially literate.  In fact, Schmidt and Wilkins (2013) and report that audit committee chairs 
that have accounting financial expertise provide the most-timely disclosures. We therefore expect 
audit committee chair financial expertise to be more valuable than overall audit committee financial 
expertise, as the audit committee chair is likely to be more active in helping constrain the audit 
report lag thereby improving financial reporting timeliness.  From this discussion, the following 
hypothesis is proposed; 
H1: The audit committee chair financial expertise are negatively associated with financial 
reporting timeliness. 
 
There is a very strong view on the impact of experiential expertise of audit committee members on 
their ability to fulfil their duties competently and effectively. A view taken in earlier empirical studies 
(Kosnik, 1990; Beasley 1996) was that longer board service allows directors to gain more firm 
specific knowledge and enables them to better equip themselves to deal with complicated 
committee proceedings, hence resulting in improved performance in protecting shareholder’s 
interests. For example, Beasley (1996) report that firms with long average board tenure of outside 
directors are less likely to have financial reporting fraud and Bedard et al., (2004) find that audit 
committee members with longer tenure on the board are associated with less aggressive earnings 
management. More recently, Abernathy et al., (2014) report that audit committee members with 
longer tenure have a significant negative impact on audit report lag.  Similarly Sun and Liu (2014), 
find that audit committee members’ board tenure is negatively associated with bank risk measured 
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by total risk or idiosyncratic risk. They also find that firm performance is more positively associated 
with long board tenure, consistent with the notion that audit committee effectiveness may increase 
risk management effectiveness.   
However, there are a small number of studies which argue to the contrary to longer term 
tenure benefits. For example, Vafeas (2003) argues that longer board service might compromise 
audit committee directors’ independence by bringing directors and management closer resulting in 
directors befriending management. In another recent study, Chan et al., (2013) have also 
documented a negative association between the proportion of audit committee members serving 
longer on the board and audit fees.  Nonetheless, the overall argument is skewed in favour of longer 
term tenure of audit committee members benefiting financial reporting quality.  As the role of the 
audit committee chair is more pivotal, we therefore propose that audit committee chair tenure will 
also have a direct effect on the audit report lag.  In light of the above discussion, this study proposes 
the following hypothesis; 
H2: Audit committee chair experiential expertise are negatively associated with financial 
reporting timeliness. 
 
2.3 Audit Committee Chair Monitoring Expertise 
We identify monitoring expertise of the audit committee chair through the holding of multiple 
committee seats.  The monitoring role of directors involves overseeing management in order to 
reduce potential agency problems.  This is undertaken through various board oversight committees 
and directors may be required to sit on more than one committee, especially if board size does not 
allow much flexibility.  There are many independent directors who devote significant time to 
monitoring responsibilities by concurrently serving on multiple oversight committees (Heidrick & 
Struggles, 2007).  This can broaden understanding of the firm and its operating environment, 
thereby enhancing the ability of independent directors to make better-informed decisions.  
Consequently, Faleye et al. (2011) argue that independent directors who concurrently serve on 
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multiple oversight committees are more monitoring-intensive and devote significant time and 
efforts to oversight duties.  These arguments have also been demonstrated in the scant literature.  
Cook and Wang (2010) find that directors serving on other committees are better informed than 
other directors as they have an informational advantage over other directors.  Similarly, Vafeas 
(2005) note that assigning more monitoring duties to individual independent directors can lead to 
improvements in oversight quality and reduction in potential agency costs.  As a result, Faleye et al., 
(2011) note how these monitoring improvements can cause firms to exhibit greater sensitivity of 
CEO turn over to firm performance, lower excess executive compensation, and reduce earnings 
management.  
The audit committee chair has the responsibility of overseeing the audit committee and 
hence the financial reporting and internal control processes.  However, in addition to chairing the 
audit committee, he/or she may also be required to sit on additional board oversight committees. By 
serving on multiple monitoring committees the audit committee chair can gain a more complete 
understanding of the firm. This broader view can aid the audit committee chair in making more 
informed decisions and may therefore be a better aid in improving financial reporting timeliness.  
We therefore hypothesise: 
H3: Audit committee chair monitoring expertise are negatively associated with financial 
reporting timeliness 
 
3 Sample and Variables Selection 
The study sample for this study comprises of FTSE-350 companies between 2007 and 2010.  In 
common with most studies in this area this study excludes all financial firms, principally insurance 
companies and banks, as they have different regulatory environments, as well as different reporting 
conventions to other companies.  The firms from the financial sector and those with missing audit 
committee and financial data were dropped from the final sample. Hence, the final sample for this 
study equals 987 firm observations. Table 1 contains details of the sampling process used. The main 
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sources of information for the study were companies' published annual report and accounts for the 
years 2007 to 2010. These annual reports were either obtained directly from the companies’ 
websites or accessed using the FAME database. The audit committee variables and other board 
variables data were manually collected. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
3.2 Dependent Variable – Audit Report Lag 
Annual audited financial statements and the annual report are often the only reliable source of 
information available to existing and potential investors (Leventis et al., 2005).  The timely 
publication of these documents adds information content and impacts the value of the firm (Sultana 
et al., 2015), thus making the audit report lag an important and fundamental issue to consider. The 
dependent variable, audit report lag, is the number of days between a firm's fiscal year-end and the 
audit report date3. 
 
3.3 Independent Variables – Audit Committee Chair expertise  
We examine the audit committee chair expertise from three perspectives; financial, experiential and 
monitoring expertise.  In relation to financial expertise, we firstly capture the broader definition of 
financial expertise of audit committee chairs4. Prior research suggests it may be useful to 
disaggregate this into accounting-specific and other expertise, with some evidence that accounting-
                                                          
3 Some studies have also utilises financial statement restatement periods (Schmidt and Wilkins, 2013) and the 
filing of 10 K reports (Abernathy et al, 2014) as proxies for financial reporting timeliness however due to data 
availability issues this study focuses on audit report lag days. 
4 The current UK Corporate Governance Code (2014), or any of its predecessors, does not provide a precise 
definition of what it means by financial expertise.  As a result, for the purposes of this study, we followed the 
SEC’s definitions, which is also used by DeFond et al., (2005) and other US-based studies whereby an 
accounting financial expert (AFE) is defined as a person who has previously held or currently holds a job 
directly related to accounting and auditing expertise. These include CPAs, CFOs, CAOs, controllers, and 
auditors.  A non-accounting financial expert, on the other hand, is defined as a person who has experience as 
an investment banker, financial analyst, or any other financial management role; or experience obtained from 
supervising the preparation of financial statements (e.g., chief executive officer or company president).  We 
follow this with appropriate modifications for the UK context in identifying financial expertise generally and 
distinguishing between accounting and non-accounting expertise. 
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specific presence on audit committees may actually lead to better quality financial reporting 
(Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; 2009). Therefore, we then examine additional separate variables 
representing the audit committee chair holding accounting and non-accounting-specific expertise. 
Secondly, we capture the experiential expertise of the audit committee chair by focusing on their 
tenure (i.e. length of board service). In line with extant research, (Beasley, 1996; Dhaliwal et al., 
2010), we suggest that length of tenure of the audit committee chair is linked to the experience they 
have gained over time and expect that longer tenured audit committee chairs are helpful in reducing 
the audit report lag. We further analyse tenure by focusing on those audit committee chairs that 
have an excess of six years tenure on the company’s board as well as those with an excess of nine 
years tenure on the board5.  In relation to audit committee chair monitoring expertise, we capture 
the number of additional committee seats held by the audit committee chair. To explore this further, 
we also have variables to capture those audit committee chairs that hold at least one additional 
committee seat, as well as those that hold at least two additional seats. Prior literature suggests that 
holding of multiple committee seats increases monitoring capability of non-executive directors 
(Faleye et al., 2011). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
3.4 Independent Variables – Other Control Variables 
We have a composite variable (ACE) representing instances where audit committees comprise at 
least three members, contained at least one financial expert, all members being independent and 
met at least three times during the financial year, thereby representing companies in full compliance 
with current governance recommendations in respect of audit committee characteristics.  Prior 
research suggests that such audit committees are helpful in improving financial reporting quality 
                                                          
5 This is motivated by current governance regulation in the UK which raises concerns about the independence 
of non-executives with extended tenure, specifically raising concerns about those with tenure exceeding six 
years and categorizing those non-executives with tenure in excess of nine years as not being independent. 
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(Abbott et al., 2003; Zaman et al., 2011). We use the proportion of independent non-executive 
directors serving on the board of directors to represent board independence since, from an agency 
theory perspective, the ability of the board to act as an effective monitoring mechanism depends on 
its independence from management (Beasley, 1996; O’Sullivan, 2000). We include the proportion of 
ownership held by executive directors as a control variable since prior research shows that the 
ownership of inside directors constrains opportunistic behaviour of directors (Warfield et al., 1995; 
Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009).   Other than these audit committee and board variables, 
in line with prior research, we have a number of other firm specific control variables that are 
expected to affect audit report lag. These include firms audited by big 4 firms, proportion of equity 
held by the block-holders, firm size, firm financial performance, financial leverage, complexity level 
and an acquisition (Jaggi and Tsui, 2003; Leventis et al., 2005; Sultana et al., 2015). 
 
4. Key Findings 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics in table 3 show that the mean value for audit report lag stands at around 64 
days with a median value of 62 days. Of particular interest to our study are the descriptive statistics 
in relation to the audit committee chair characteristics.  The dummy variable representing audit 
committee chair financial expertise shows that 92 percent of audit committee chairs are financial 
experts, 72 percent of audit committee chairs are considered accounting experts and 21 percent are 
non-accounting experts. The average tenure of audit committee chairs stands at 54 months with a 
median tenure of 48 months. However, the range of audit committee chairs tenure is a minimum 
term of 1 month to a maximum term of 288 months. Further analysis shows that 27 percent of audit 
committee chairs have served for more than 6 years on the company’s board and 7 percent of audit 
committee chairs have served for more than 9 years. The average number of additional committee 
seats held by the audit committee chair stands at 1.65, with a range of 0 to 3 for other committee 
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seats.  93 percent of audit committee chairs sit on at least 1 additional committee and 68 percent of 
audit committee chairs hold at least 2 additional committee seats.   
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
In addition to the characteristics of audit committee chairs, we also employ a composite variable to 
identify audit committees that conform to all of the recommended recommendations in terms of 
size, independence, meeting frequency and expertise (ACE).  74 per cent of audit committees in our 
sample satisfy all four of the recommended characteristics.  We have also captured the proportion 
of independent non executive directors on the board of directors since the current regulation 
requires firms to disclose such directors in the annual report. 48.3 percent of board members are 
independent. The average ownership level of executive directors in our sample is 4.2 per cent with a 
median ownership level of only 0.24 per cent.  The descriptive statistics of the other control 
variables suggests that 95 percent of audits are undertaken by one of the big 4 auditing firms, block 
holders hold on average 38 percent of total shares the mean ROA of firms is 9.08 percent; gearing 
levels are on average 19.28 percent, stock and receivable to total assets ratio of 27.28 percent and 
58 percent of firms were involved in an acquisition.  
 
4.2 Correlations 
Correlations are interesting in this type of study, as they not only highlight the univariate association 
between the audit report lag and the explanatory variables but also identify significant correlations 
among the independent variables.  Column one of table 4 shows that audit committee chair financial 
expertise and non-accounting specific expertise are significantly negatively correlated with audit 
report lag.  Similarly, audit committee chair tenure as well as chairs over six year tenure are 
significantly negatively correlated with the audit report lag. Audit committee chair additional 
committee seats are also significantly associated with audit report lag.  These findings suggest that 
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audit committee chairs with financial knowhow, accumulated experience and monitoring expertise 
are more effective in reducing audit report lag and hence improve financial report timeliness.   Of 
course, since we have more than one measure of various audit committee chair variables we see 
significant correlations between these linked variables.   
 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
4.3 Multivariate Regression Analysis  
Table 5 presents the multivariate regression results.  It can be seen that the tenure of the 
audit committee chair (i.e. experiential expertise) has a statistically significant and negative impact 
on the audit report lag.  Previously, in relation to audit committee members in general, Abernathy et 
al. (2014) report that longer tenure on the board is associated with reduced audit report lag. The 
additional committee seats of the audit committee chair (i.e. monitoring expertise) also has a 
statistically significant and negative impact on the audit report lag. Taken together these findings 
suggest that audit committee chairs with experiential and monitoring expertise are more effective in 
reducing delay in the audit report and hence improving the timeliness of financial reporting.  The 
impact of audit committee chair financial expertise, though negatively correlated, is statistically 
insignificant.  Our findings are important from academic and public policy perspectives.  The 
profound positive impact of the experiential and monitoring expertise of audit committee chairs on 
the audit report lag adds significantly to academic literature in relation to financial reporting 
timeliness. The current UK Corporate Governance Code (2014) indicates that non-executives who 
have tenure longer than six years may not be independent and directors with tenure longer than 
nine years are non-independent.  Yet, this study documents that audit committee chairs serving 
longer on the boards have profound positive impact on the financial reporting timeliness.  Therefore, 
we suggest there is a need to revisit these guidelines as these policy recommendations may not be 
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equally pertinent to all the non-executives regardless of their role in the organisation and might 
actually be counter intuitive in certain aspects of the financial reporting process.    
 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
From table 5, it can also be seen that composite variable representing audit committee 
compliance with the regulatory requirements has a statistically significant and negative impact on 
the audit report lag.  This shows that companies in full compliance with current governance 
recommendations in respect of audit committee characteristics are more effective in improving the 
timeliness of financial reporting. The variable representing proportionate executive ownership also 
has a statistically significant and negative impact on the audit report lag, suggesting support for 
argument that such directors behave in the interest of shareholders (Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-
Ballesta, 2009).   The regression results in relation to other variables show that the firms audited by 
the big 4 firms has a reduced audit report lag. The size of the firm has a negative impact however 
financial leverage, complexity level and firms involved in an acquisition have a positive impact on the 
audit report lag.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
In table 6 we explore our findings in more detail. In regressions 2 and 3 we investigate the impact of 
accounting and non-accounting expertise on audit report lag however both these distinctions of 
financial expertise are statistically insignificant.  The significant impact of experiential and 
monitoring expertise in table 5 has motivated us to explore these results in more detail.  In 
regressions 4 and 5 we extend our investigation of audit committee chair tenure by substituting this 
variable with variables representing audit committee chair tenure in excess of six years and in excess 
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of nine years with dummy variables. Columns three and four of the regression table 6 suggests that 
audit committee chairs exceeding tenure in excess of six years having a significantly profound impact 
in reducing the audit report delay.  This finding coupled with the tabled 5 results, confirms that 
experiential expertise of audit committee chairs, i.e. accumulated knowledge and experience from 
serving longer on the board, results in more effective audit committee chairs, at least in the face of 
improved financial reporting timeliness.   Secondly, in the regression models 5 and 6, we create two 
more variables, one representing the number of audit committee chairs holding at least 1 additional 
committee seats and the other representing the number of audit committee chairs holding at least 2 
additional committee seats.  The results show that both these variables have a statistically significant 
and negative impact on the audit report delay, suggesting that monitoring expertise of the audit 
committee chair play a significant role in reducing audit report delay and hence improving financial 
reporting timeliness. 
 
4.4 Alternative Variables and Tests  
Due to the nature of our research approach, in particular the use of financial statements to collect 
data on our audit committee variables, we were able to compile a comprehensive dataset of audit 
committee characteristics.  This allowed us to test the impact of a number of additional audit 
committee variables on the audit report lag but the individual results are not presented here due to 
lack of significance and space constraints6.  This section briefly describes the alternative variables we 
have employed in the unreported analysis.  First, as a further extension to our data on the expertise 
of audit committee chair, we collected data on the financial, experiential and monitoring expertise 
of audit committee members to investigate whether such expertise of audit committee members 
had an impact on the audit report lag. None of these variable were statistically significant in any of 
our regressions. Second, we also collected data on the other directorships held by the audit 
committee chair as well as by the other audit committee members to investigate whether audit 
                                                          
6 All the unreported results are available from the authors on request. 
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committee chair or non-chair members busyness had an impact on the financial reporting timeliness. 
However these variables were also statistically insignificant.  
Other than these additional expertise and busyness variables we have also collected data on 
audit committee composition. This includes data on audit committee compliance with regulations in 
relation to individual four elements of audit committees recommended by UK regulators7. We find 
that audit committees that meet at least three times a year has a negative and significant impact on 
the audit report lag period, suggesting a profound impact of diligent audit committees in improving 
financial reporting timeliness.  
 
5. Conclusions 
Recent research has found the role played by the audit committee chair significantly reflects that of 
a person who is in charge of steering a group of people.  This is consistent with how the audit 
committee chair has been viewed by various accounting bodies.  This study therefore seeks to 
investigate whether the financial, experiential and monitoring expertise of the audit committee chair 
has any impact in improving financial reporting timeliness.  We find that audit committee chairs with 
experiential and monitoring expertise are more effective in constraining the audit report lag and 
improve financial reporting timeliness.  These findings add significantly to our understanding of the 
importance of the audit committee chair expertise in relation to financial reporting timeliness.   
To better understand the different caveats discussed in this study, we suggest future 
research takes a more in depth and qualitative understanding of the role of the audit committee 
chair in the wider governance arena.  Like this study, existing research on audit committees is 
conducted almost exclusively in the context of agency theory. Yet, research into corporate 
governance should acknowledge the broader social responsibility role of organisations and relevance 
                                                          
7  Current governance recommendations in respect of audit committee characteristics include; audit 
committees comprise at least three members, contained at least one financial expert, all members being 
independent and met at least three times during the financial year. 
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to stakeholders other than shareholders.  This would relate more closely with current expectations 
of governance oriented research from a broad range of theoretical paradigms.  
17 
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Tables 
Table 1 (a): Sample selection process  
 
Description 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
FTSE350 350 350 350 350 1400 
Financial firms 75 75 75 75 300 
Missing AC and DataStream information 27 27 26 25 105 
Outliers 2 2 2 2 8 
Final sample size 246 246 247 248 987 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 (b):  Industry distribution of sample firms 
 
Industry Name N Percentage 
Consumer Goods 216  21.88 
Industrials 294 29.79 
Mineral extraction 79 8.00 
Services 342 34.65 
Utilities 56  5.67 
Final Sample Size 987 100 
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Table 2: Variable Definitions 
Variable Label Definitions 
Audit report lag 
Number of days between a firm's fiscal year-end and the audit report 
date. 
AC chair financial expertise 
Dummy variable (=1 if audit committee chair has is a financial expert; 
=0 otherwise) 
AC chair accounting expertise 
Dummy variable (=1 if audit committee chair has is an accounting 
expert; =0 otherwise) 
AC chair non-accounting expertise 
Dummy variable (=1 if audit committee chair is a non-accounting 
expert; =0 otherwise) 
AC chair tenure Audit committee chair length (months) of service on the board 
AC chair tenure over 6 years 
Dummy variable (=1 if audit committee chair length of service on the 
board exceeds 6 years; =0 otherwise). 
AC chair tenure over 9 years 
Dummy variable (=1 if audit committee chair length of service on the 
board exceeds 9 years; =0 otherwise). 
AC chair additional committees 
Number of additional committee seats held by the audit committee 
chairs 
AC chair 1 plus committees  
Proportion of audit committee chairs holding at least 1 additional 
committee seats   
AC chair 2 plus committees 
Proportion of audit committee chairs holding at least 2 additional 
committee seats   
ACE 
Dummy variable (=1 if audit committee has 3 or more members; 
contains 1 financial expert; comprises only independent directors and 
has held 3 or more meetings during the year; =0 otherwise) 
% Independent directors 
Percentage of  board represented by independent non-executive 
directors 
% Executive share ownership Percentage of equity held by executive directors 
Big4 
Dummy variable (=1 if audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, 
Deloitte and Touche or Ernst & Young; =0 otherwise)  
% Block-holding Proportion of equity held by the block holders  
Log total assets Log of total assets 
% ROA Return on assets 
% Gearing Debt to equity ratio 
Log of subsidiaries Log of subsidiaries 
Receivables-inventory ratio Ratio of trade receivables and inventory to total assets 
Acquisition 
Dummy variable (=1 if the company made an acquisition in the last 
year =0 otherwise) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics 
Variables1 Mean Median St.dev Minimum Maximum 
Audit Report Lag 63.84 62.00 15.491 25 131 
Log Audit Lag 1.79 1.79 0.10 1.40 2.12 
AC chair financial expertise .92 1.00 .266 0 1 
AC chair accounting expertise .72 1.00 .450 0 1 
AC chair non-accounting expertise .21 .00 .404 0 1 
AC chair tenure (months) 54.33 48.00 37.119 1 288 
AC chair tenure over 6 years .27 .00 .445 0 1 
AC chair tenure over 9 years .07 .00 .259 0 1 
AC chair additional committees 1.65 2.00 .673 0 3 
AC chair 1 plus committees .93 1.00 .258 0 1 
AC chair 2 plus committees .68 1.00 .466 0 1 
ACE .74 1.00 .437 0 1 
% Independent directors 48.32 50.00 11.17 10.53 85.71 
% Executive share ownership 4.02 0.24 11.04 0.00 67.74 
Big4 0.95 1.00 0.21 0.00 1.00 
% Block-holding 38.34 38.19 17.84 0.00 92.40 
Log total assets 9.04 8.97 0.66 7.52 11.19 
% ROA 9.08 7.63 10.80 -83.57 118.56 
% Gearing 19.28 16.89 16.91 0.00 80.67 
Log of subsidiaries 1.22 1.26 0.39 0.00 2.23 
Stock-inventory ratio 27.28 25.02 19.53 0.00 97.92 
Acquisition 0.58 1.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
1 Definitions of variables are given in table 1 
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Table 4:  Correlation Matrix1 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 Log Audit Lag 1 
                
    
2 Chair financial expertise -.071 1 
               
    
3 Chair accounting expertise .015 .460 1 
              
    
4 Chair non-accounting expertise -.064 .147 -.811 1 
             
    
5 Log chair tenure -.109 .040 -.113 .151 1 
            
    
6 Chair tenure over 6 years -.076 -.059 -.141 .118 .619 1 
           
    
7 Chair tenure over 9 years .025 -.022 -.182 .187 .397 .457 1 
          
    
8 AC chair additional committees -.081 .003 .051 -.055 .090 .035 -.005 1 
         
    
9 AC chair 1 plus committees -.075 -.034 .029 -.055 .054 .037 -.006 .682 1 
        
    
10 AC chair 2 plus committees -.068 .014 .076 -.076 .085 .040 .011 .890 .406 1 
       
    
11 ACE -.184 .069 -.024 .072 .048 -.049 -.041 -.033 -.027 -.029 1 
      
    
12 % Independent directors -.133 -.001 -.053 .058 .048 -.003 -.059 -.202 -.187 -.205 .433 1 
     
    
13 % Executive share ownership .069 .022 .039 -.030 -.031 .015 .059 .007 .026 -.008 -.197 -.227 1 
    
    
14 Big4 -.175 .065 .079 -.045 .033 .010 -.053 .009 -.042 .028 .228 .120 -.166 1 
   
    
15 % Block-holding .105 -.096 -.002 -.061 .016 -.013 .014 .051 .063 .047 -.098 -.110 -.104 .075 1 
  
    
16 Log total assets -.255 .130 -.040 .130 .022 -.026 -.076 -.159 -.145 -.195 .362 .451 -.187 .183 -.357 1 
 
    
17 % ROA  .030 -.012 -.018 .013 -.054 .001 -.003 -.026 -.026 -.012 -.015 -.028 .076 -.065 -.028 -.216 1     
18 % Gearing -.121 .066 .036 .003 -.006 -.059 -.010 .014 -.007 -.001 .110 .051 -.137 .199 .019 .311 -.247 1    
19 Log of subsidiaries .022 .036 -.019 .045 .018 .025 -.032 -.041 -.077 -.059 .110 .114 -.092 .118 -.043 .296 -.058 .023 1   
20 Stock-inventory ratio .093 -.072 -.022 -.023 .021 .026 -.063 .102 .089 .129 -.026 -.103 -.049 .045 .020 -.224 .027 -.275 -.045 1  
21 Acquisition -.011 .009 -.037 .047 -.005 -.022 -.072 -.107 -.092 -.116 .123 .042 -.105 .081 -.076 .229 -.040 .071 .265 -.066 1 
1Bold and italic font represent significant correlations at 1% and 5% respectively 
 
25 
 
Table 5: The Impact of Audit Committee Chair Expertise on Financial Reporting Timeliness (***, **, 
* represent significant correlations at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively) 
 
Variables Expected Sign Coefficient T Value VIF 
AC Chair financial expertise - -.002 -.135 1.068 
Log of AC chair tenure - -.026 -2.916*** 1.036 
AC Chair additional committees - -.014 -2.790*** 1.141 
ACE - -.020 -2.244** 1.401 
% Independent directors - .000 -.668 1.551 
% Executive share ownership - -.001 -2.056** 1.206 
Big4 - -.051 -2.918*** 1.186 
% Block-holding - .000 .303 1.337 
Log total assets - -.053 -7.073*** 2.514 
% ROA - -.001 -1.596 1.181 
% Gearing + .000 1.683* 1.393 
Log of subsidiaries + .034 3.703*** 1.282 
Stock-inventory ratio + .000 2.625*** 1.359 
Acquisition + .017 2.499** 1.193 
Industry Dummy  Included  
Year Dummy  Included  
Constant  2.362 33.65***  
F Test  10.481***  
(Adjusted) R2  .184  
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Table 6: The Impact of Audit Committee Chair Expertise on Financial Reporting Timeliness (***, **, * represent significant correlations at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively) 
 
 AC Chair Financial Expertise AC Chair Experiential Expertise AC Chair Additional Committee Seats 
Variables 
Accounting Non-accounting Tenure>6 Tenure>9 1 additional seat 2 additional seats 
Coefficient         T Value   Coefficient     T Value Coefficient    T Value Coefficient        T Value Coefficient    T Value 
Chair financial expertise     -.005 -.422 -.003 -.266 -.003 -.225 -.001 -.080 
Chair accounting expertise .010 1.347           
Chair non-accounting expertise   -.013 -1.589         
Log of chair tenure -.024 -2.716*** -.023 -2.597**     -.027 -3.083*** -.026 -2.943*** 
Chair tenure over 6 years     -.023 -3.236***       
Chair tenure over 9 years       -.009 -.701     
Chair additional committees -.014 -2.857*** -.014 -2.879*** -.015 -2.962*** -.016 -3.122***     
Chair 1 plus committee seats         -.033 -2.599***   
Chair 2 plus committee seats           -.019 -2.685*** 
ACE -.020 -2.266** -.019 -2.186** -.021 -2.453** -.020 -2.239** -.020 -2.281** -.020 -2.253** 
% Independent directors .000 -.608 .000 -.699 .000 -.745 .000 -.824 .000 -.637 .000 -.599 
% Executive share ownership -.001 -2.109** -.001 -2.098** -.001 -2.046** -.001 -2.000** -.001 -1.989** -.001 -2.112** 
Big4 -.053 -3.024*** -.053 -3.034*** -.050 -2.874*** -.052 -2.953*** -.053 -3.042*** -.050 -2.880*** 
% Block-holding .000 .331 .000 .250 .000 .133 .000 .218 .000 .471 .000 .248 
Log total assets -.053 -7.136*** -.053 -7.056*** -.054 -7.125*** -.054 -7.127*** -.051 -6.877*** -.054 -7.101*** 
% ROA .000 -1.571 -.001 -1.590 .000 -1.525 .000 -1.526 .000 -1.557 .000 -1.574 
% Gearing .000 1.664* .000 1.645 .000 1.648 .000 1.733* .000 1.606 .000 1.663* 
Log of subsidiaries .034 3.722*** .034 3.739*** .034 3.768*** .034 3.697*** .031 3.478*** .033 3.676*** 
Stock-inventory ratio .000 2.663*** .000 2.644*** .000 2.642*** .000 2.507** .000 2.631*** .001 2.662*** 
Acquisition .018 2.568** .018 2.546** .017 2.434** .017 2.412** .018 2.623*** .017 2.489** 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Dummy included included included Included Included Included 
Constant 2.355 33.741*** 2.361 33.889*** 2.337 33.619*** 2.338 33.397*** 2.357 33.619*** 2.354 33.792*** 
F Test 10.588*** 10.631*** 10.597*** 10.007*** 10.420*** 10.447*** 
(Adjusted) R2 .186 .186 .186 .176 .183 .183 
 
